

Vergangenheitsbewältigung vs. Amnesia:

How Germany and Japan processed their Records of Macro-Crimes

By

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Numata Conference in Buddhist Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, March 20–21, 2014
Violence, Nonviolence, and Japanese Religions: Past, Present, and Future
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The three regimes that developed distinct varieties of Fascism and plunged the world into World War II have dealt with the record of their violence in remarkably different ways. Italy that began to set the Fascist tone of the early 20th century with Mussolini's March on Rome in 1922 has almost completely succeeded in deleting its violent and mass-killing African expeditions in Libya (1925) and Ethiopia (1935) from its own history books. It has also managed to make the world forget that it was one of the three *Axis* powers. The fact that Italians experienced an internal regime change in July 1943, after the landing of American and British troops in Sicily, removing Mussolini from power, though he was reinstated by German force as a client dictator in Salò in the North, yet prosecuted by Italian partisans in a summary court martial trial in April 1945, shot with his mistress and brought to Milan where their corpses were strung up by their feet at a lamppost on a public square, these events have created the illusive impression that Italy had freed itself without outside help from Fascism.

Contemporary Japan still avoids to include the entire *Showa* period in its historical self-understanding of WWII, when it invaded China's Manchuria region in 1931, extended its reach into neighboring provinces and then launched a full military attack on the rest of China in 1937 with terror scenarios like the 'Rape of Nanjing' in December of that year. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2014, the present Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, illustrated this avoidance by trying to explain to the gathering of political and economic leaders from around the world the growing tensions between Japan and China by alluding to the tension between Great Britain and imperial Germany before WW I. He was immediately answered by a spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry and asked in a pointed way: "Rather than

using pre-World War I Anglo-German relations, why don't you deeply examine your mistakes during the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula and the fascist war that Japan launched on victim countries in World War II?"¹

According to accounts of private dinner conversations at Davos that have been circulating on the Web, Chinese feelings of resentment of Japanese behavior in recent months have reached extreme levels of intensity and are met by no less intense Japanese responses. The persistent Japanese avoidance of critically processing the past may have been supported by the initial American obsession with searching for and identifying the Japanese leaders, who had been responsible for the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on the 7th of December in 1941, and dismissing the Japanese terror in the occupied countries,

The 2013 Hollywood movie *Emperor* (director Peter Webber) reemphasizes this American preoccupation with itself when in the reenacted conversations between General Douglas MacArthur (played by Tommy Lee Jones) and members of his staff at the end of August 1945 in Tokyo about the questions of the war- guilt of Hirohito and whether he should be put on trial, the movie audience is left with the impression that WWII began with Pearl Harbor in 1941. Not only is the European War Theater not mentioned, but the Japanese invasion of China in 1931 and the horrors since 1937 are not part of the history the Americans in the movie are talking about. In their American centered perspective, whatever happened before Pearl Harbor never became part of their historical knowledge interest. The movie captures accurately the atmosphere in U.S. military circles in Tokyo at the beginning of the occupation and their mystified perception of the role of the

¹ A. R. Sorkin, "Anxiety Rises Over Japan and China's Relations", in: *The New York Times* (28 January 2014).

emperor whom majorities in the American political class, possibly including President Harry Truman, and the society at large wanted to see punished. Gen. Bonner Fellers (played by Matthew Fox) who is charged with investigating the war guilt of the emperor and can't come up with clear evidence one way or the other, becomes drawn into the mythical tale of the divine origin of the emperor and speculates about the impact his indictment would have on Japanese society. The answers he gets from his Japanese contacts envision a catastrophic collapse of order with unmanageable anti-American violence. The validity of this doomsday prediction in the movie has never been explored. I simply want to point out that the American ambivalence at that crucial time and their refusal to put the emperor on trial possibly encouraged the continuous evasiveness of the Japanese political class to confront openly the violent record of imperial Japan. The lack of American pressure is also partly responsible for the Japanese unwillingness to openly meet the demands of the mostly Chinese and Korean Comfort Women, which were forced to serve in military bordellos, and of the surviving victims of the terror campaigns in Nanjing and other parts of China. Both survivor groups are now in their 80s or 90s. The evasiveness reflects also the unsettled memory and the self-serving claims of being, as the result of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, itself a victimized nation.

Germany's processing of its past, identified by a composite German word, namely *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, that has entered the comparative literature on state apologies, has been recognized as one of the most successful and open processes of accepting responsibility for evil and destructive actions by a political regime in modern

history.² Still, the ease with which anti-German slogans and defaced images of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel with Hitler moustache showed up in demonstrations during the recurring Euro crisis in Greece, Spain, Cyprus and other places indicates that the use and abuse of the past for political purposes remains always an option. Even the renowned British social scientist Anthony Giddens cannot resist, in his newest book on developments in Europe, the temptation to echo British conservative prejudices when talking about the role of Germany. Though he doesn't use the phrase *Fourth Reich* that is often quoted in order to warn of German power, he hints at the same thing when he writes: "On the face of things, Germany seems to have achieved by pacific means what it was unable to bring about through military conquest – the domination of Europe. As a permanent condition, however, 'German Europe' is a non starter."³ A 2013 three-part German television production, "*Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter*" (Our Mothers, Our Fathers), dealing openly and critically with the attitudes and behavior of the grandparents and parents of the middle aged Germans of today during the Nazi period, was watched in Germany and other European countries by huge audiences. Polish viewers were offended by the portrayal of some Polish partisans as being as violently anti-Semitic as the Germans. Instead of seeing this documentary as an opportunity for Poland to come to terms with an anti-Semitic history that the Polish-American political scientist Jan T. Gross has documented in his studies of the town Jedwabne and Anti-Semitism in Poland

² See Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2008 and Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation. From Enmity to Amity*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 2012.

³ Anthony Giddens, *Turbulent and Mighty Continent. What Future for Europe?* Cambridge/ Malden, MA: Polity Press 2013, p. 9.

after Auschwitz⁴, critics lashed out at the TV series as being a typical German escape mechanism, trying to relativize a universal indictment by finding co-culprits. The long *New York Times*’ review of the movie when it was released in the U.S. in January 2014 concluded in a somewhat cynical way: “The chaste, self-sacrificing Aryans, the lieutenant and the nurse, though they are not without guilt, are the heroes of the story, just as they would have been in a German film made in 1943. The moral this time around is that they have, at long last, earned the world’s forgiveness.”⁵

The German acceptance of responsibility for the past was never self-evident. The German response to the proceedings and the final judgment of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945 was not different from the Japanese response to the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948. In both defeated societies, the tribunals and their judgments were seen as victor’s justice. A gripping sense of apathy that struck Hannah Arendt, for example, on her first post-war visit to Germany from August 1949 to March 1950 was overwhelming and didn’t allow for any emotions of empathy for the victims and survivors of Nazi terror to emerge⁶. Germans were, as the German Buchenwald survivor Eugen Kogon reported about his encounters with audiences that had come to listen to him speaking about his life in a Nazi concentration camp, preoccupied with experiences of death and destruction during the escalating bombing raids, the fear of the advancing Red Army and having survived in bombed out cities and in huge refugee camps, mostly in the Western occupation zones⁷.

⁴ Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001 and J. T. Gross, *Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation*. New York: Random House 2006.

⁵ A. O. Scott, „A History Lesson, Airbrushed“, in: *The New York Times* (15 January 2014).

⁶ Hannah Arendt, „The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. Report from Germany“, in: *Commentary* (October 1950).

⁷ Eugen Kogon, „Gericht und Gewissen“, in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1946.

Focusing primarily on the Japanese and the German politics of memory beginning in May 1945 with the capitulation of the Third Reich and in August 1945 with the surrender of Imperial Japan, one aspect becomes immediately clear. Only Germany faced the fate that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had spelled out at the Casablanca conference in January of 1943 for the *Axis* powers, namely unconditional surrender. The peculiar circumstances that affected the Italian case since the internal regime putsch of 1943 and its consequences have already been mentioned. The Japanese story, however, deserves some special scrutiny because of the American insistence on excluding emperor Hirohito not only from prosecution but retaining him as the symbolic head of the Japanese state and preserving the emperor system. For the Americans the primary question had been after the Japanese capitulation and after they had landed in Tokyo whether the emperor had given the orders to bomb the American fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941. Once General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was satisfied that no evidence could be found to blame the attack on Pearl Harbor on the emperor, Hirohito became by American fiat a sacrosanct person. The man who had presided officially since 1926 over imperial Japan and signed off on all imperial business before and during the war went scot-free. What did MacArthur and his American advisers think when they made this decision and what consequences did it have for Japan, the countries of Asia and especially East Asia that Japan had terrorized with its war activities?

The Japanese social philosopher, Maruyama Masao, suggested already in 1946 that Japan's "ultranationalism", which was quoted frequently in the first year of the Tokyo Trial as the ideological foundation of the warring empire, needed further

investigation because it contained a spiritual dimension that was absent from the Western variety of nationalism.⁸ This spiritual dimension has recently been discussed in a book on Shinto ultranationalism.⁹ The American historian for East Asia, Walter Skya, points out in his introduction that the topic had been a neglected area not only in Western scholarship: “The serious study of radical Shinto ultranationalist ideology in the Taisho and Showa periods has, for the most part, been shunned by Japanese scholars as well. It is still somewhat of a taboo subject in Japan, for the story of the ideology of radical Shinto ultranationalism is connected with a prewar past that most Japanese would rather forget. Many Japanese still have difficulty coming to terms with their prewar and wartime history and do not seem to be comfortable investigating the radical Shinto ultranationalist ideology that once glorified Japanese imperialism and mobilized the Japanese masses to wage total war in Asia and the Pacific in the 1930s and the 1940s. In other words, today’s Japan is still very much in the business of trying to keep a tight lid on the ideology of its wartime past.”¹⁰ For Skya it is clear that the devotion of the Japanese masses to the emperor until August 15 1945, when he spoke for the first time directly to the people, had totalitarian qualities.

Skya retraces in his study of Japanese nationalism since the Meiji restoration in 1868 the various intellectual attempts at finding a foundation for the renewed imperial order. He introduces us to a group of Japanese students who went to Germany to study law and philosophy. Since Germany had become in 1871, at the time of the Meiji restoration, for the first time a nation state and had through Prime Minister Bismarck’s

⁸ Maruyama Masao, “Logik und Psychologie des Ultrationalismus”, in: *Freiheit und Nation in Japan. Ausgewählte Aufsätze 1936-1949*. Ed. W. Seifert. Vol. 1. Munich, Iudicum Verlag 2007, p. 113-144.

⁹ Walter A. Skya, *Japan’s Holy War. The Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultrationalism*. Durham/ London: Duke University Press 2009.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

magisterial handling of affairs chosen the Prussian King as German Emperor¹¹ and engaged on a similar journey of defining its legitimacy, it seemed only natural for the young intellectuals to go to Germany. The results of this intellectual adventure were, as Skya describes in intriguing detail, that the whole variety of state theories that were taught at that time by German legal scholars became absorbed by the Japanese students and, after they had returned with their German degrees to Japan, filled with Japanese reality. Their stay in Germany had convinced some of them that there was a major “incompatibility of core Chinese Confucian principles and the Japanese Shinto political ideal of the unbroken line of emperors...”¹² They rejected the patriarchal Confucian family system as model for their own political thinking and began to develop, among many other variants, the symbolic discourse of the emperor’s genealogy going back to the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami.

During their stay in Prussia and after 1871 Germany, the students became acquainted with the symbolic discourse of „the divine right of kings”, in German called *Gottesgnadentum*, which the monarchists used as an ideological weapon against all the political tendencies that the liberals of various persuasions used to promote their political project, namely constitutional containment of the monarchy based on the sovereignty of the people. The Prussian monarchists who had under the leadership of Bismarck created the Second German Empire were fighting, like the supporters of the Meiji restoration, a similar battle against the formation of liberal ideas that started to undermine the foundation of monarchy. The Japanese adopted almost literally the slogan of the English ideologue of “divine right”, Robert Filmer, whom they encountered in German literature.

¹¹ See the chapter on “The Unification of Germany” in Jonathan Steinberg’s biography, *Bismarck. A Life*. New York: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 258-311.

¹² Skya, *Japan’s Holy War*, p. 67f.

Filmer identified in the subtitle of his book *Patriarcha*, which he had written between 1635 and 1642, the “Defense of the Natural Powers of King against the Unnatural Liberty of the People.” That book was published posthumously in 1680 (Filmer had died in 1653) by English monarchists and had provoked John Locke to write a detailed rebuttal, which was added as the *First Treatise of Civil Government* to the already 1679 completed manuscript of the *Second Treatise*; the *Two Treatises* became published in 1690. Locke had recognized the danger of Filmer’s argumentation, undermining the notion of a social contract by speculatively affirming the divine legitimacy of kings and connecting it with the first man in the biblical narrative of creation, namely Adam.¹³

The English King James I (1603-1625) who had been the most expressive proponent of the “divine right of kings” discourse as a symbolic cover for his absolutist power claim, spelled out, in a speech in 1616 before the Star Chamber, the essential need for mystification of monarchical rule when he warned against the removal of the veil of mystery. He said: “Incroach not upon the Prerogative of the Crown. If there falls out a question that concerns my Prerogative or mystery of State, deal not with it: ... for they are transcendent matters.” He continued in another part of the speech by saying: “It is Atheisme and blasphemie to dispute what God can do: good Christians content themselves with his will revealed in his word, so, it is presumption and high contempt in a Subject, to dispute what a king can do, or say that a king cannot do this, or that; but rest in that which is the kings revealed will in his Law... That which concerns the mystery of the Kings power, is not lawful to be disputed; for that is to wade into the weakness of Princes, and to take away the mystical reverence, that belongs unto them that sit on

¹³ See my article “‘Divine Right of Kings’: James I and Robert Filmer”, in: E. Voegelin (ed.), *Zwischen Revolution und Restauration*. Munich: List Verlag 1968, p. 17-46.

throne of God.”¹⁴ The English threat of the absolutist monarchists was finally banned by the constitutional arrangement of the *Glorious Revolution* of 1688/89 when the monarch became institutionally linked to and contained by the two houses of parliament. It was, as Steve Pincus calls it in his book on the conclusion of the English revolutionary 17th century the first “modern revolution”. He writes: “The English throughout the 1680s, 1690s, and thereafter were politically and ideologically divided. There was no moment of English cohesion against an un-English king. There was no period in the late seventeenth century in which the sensible people of England collaborated to rid themselves against an irrational monarch The Revolution of 1688-89 was, like all other revolutions, violent, popular, and divisive.”¹⁵

Filmer’s foundational genealogy and the mystery of power articulated by James were used by Japanese scholars in the Meiji period. The scholar Hozumi replaced however Adam with the sun goddess Amaterasu¹⁶ and used Japanese substitutes for all other biblical references. “In Hozumi’s political theology”, according to Skya, “the present emperor was not really an independent individual but Amaterasu Omikami living in the present.” He stressed the divine parentage for all Japanese; it meant that, as Skya writes: “...the Japanese ethnic group was a divine ethnic group, and the Japanese state was a divine state, since ethnicity was identical to the state and nationality.”¹⁷ This völkisch sounding language and the ideas it transported connected Japanese ultranationalist Shintoism with similar ideas in Nazi Germany. Skya quotes the

¹⁴ *The Political Works of James I.* Ed. by C.H. MacIlwain. New York 1965, p. XXXIX and XL.

¹⁵ Steve Pincus, 1688. *The First Modern Revolution*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press 2009, p. 8.

¹⁶ Skya, *Japan’s Holy War*, p. 62.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

ultranationalist Shintoist Fujisawa Chikao from the 1930s as saying that “pure Nazism was really a manifestation of the Japanese spirit on German soil.”¹⁸

Disregarding the absurdity of this argument about the Japanese roots of Nazi ideology, one should turn it around and say that the Japanese ultranationalists in the making discovered during their intellectual journeys to Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century and reporting about their findings in their work, *völkisch* race thinking before it had mutated to *Nationalsozialismus*. The Japanese felt already encouraged by the deep anti-Western resentment they encountered in the conservative German academic milieu since they were equally troubled by the whole complex of revolutionary ideas that challenged the foundation of the emperor system. This anti-enlightenment attitude became even more strengthened by the ethno-racial purity ideology that had taken hold in the new German empire and was easily transferable to Japan’s self-promotion in East-Asia. The similarities in racist identity thinking and ethnic cleansing policies became actualized in the 1930s and 1940s as ideological trademarks of Nazi Germany and Showa Japan. Both regimes conquered Europe and Asia respectively with a comparable racial superiority complex, though Nazi Germany executed it to the fullest genocidal extreme with the Jewish Holocaust. The question, however, remains why Germany that assisted, by example, Meiji Japan in creating its institutional structure and, more importantly, its ‘divine’ mythical legitimacy succeeded in processing this loaded past and its gruesome culmination in the middle of the 20th century whereas Japan is still fighting back official recognition of the evil record of its past?

Germany’s ‘unconditional surrender’ did not only mean the suspension of all German sovereignty and the takeover of all national authority by the four occupation

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 221.

powers, it also meant the historically unique abolition of the state that had played since the early 18th century next to Austria a hegemonic role in German history. Prussia was seen by the victors of the war as the historical driving force of militarism which had united “with blood and iron” most of the more than 30 sovereign entities that had survived Napoleon’s rearrangement of the German map and even continued to exist after the defeat of Napoleon’s armies in 1814/15. In the eyes of the Allies, Prussia had been the core of Nazi Germany’s planning and execution of the war of aggression. Whatever role historical Prussia may have played over the centuries, it certainly was not the core of Nazi Germany. Yet Prussia became imagined by the victors as that core and therefore had to be punished by becoming abolished as a historically constituted community. The acceptance of the abolition of Prussia after the war became facilitated by the division of Germany into four occupation zones and the freezing of this post-war occupation management at the outset of the Cold War in 1949 into the two German republics. Most of the historical Prussia, but by no means all Prussian lands, had become part of the Soviet zone which became the East German GDR. This communist part of Germany prided itself in its anti-Prussian, working class identity narrative and purged all memories of the feudal *Junker* class, blowing up, for example, the ruins of the imperial palace in the center of Berlin and replacing it with a modernist *Volkskammer* (People’s Chamber) building. This building became decommissioned by the reunification of Germany in 1990 and then destroyed by the Federal government when asbestos was discovered. Filling the empty space at the most famous Berlin Boulevard, *Unter den Linden*, led to a protracted public debate whether the old imperial palace should be rebuilt in order to close the architectural gap that had opened up as an eyesore. The decision was finally made to

recreate the façade of the palace but have it front a new building which would house institutions connected with the Humboldt University across the street and anthropological museums from all over the city. The debate about the palace was a debate about architectural aesthetics, not about the recovery of Prussia as a state.

Comparing German with Japanese memory of the past, the major difference is not simply the recognition of the record of terror and destruction and the willingness to enter into all kinds of compensation agreements with states and victim organizations. One finds all over Germany, in addition to monuments like the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in the center of Berlin, almost adjacent to the Brandenburg Gate, places of terror like Concentration Camps and Gestapo buildings having been turned into museums. The forced removal of Prussia, the center state of the nation building process in the 19th century, from the German political landscape after WWII and the absence of any political attempts to restore Prussia today is the most vivid manifestation of closure.

One of the major differences between the two cases, however, is the role the United States has played. Despite the fact that it was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the US into WWII, Japan was spared by the sole occupation power the total dismantlement of its institutional structure and, more importantly, the de-legitimation of its emperor system. In contrast to Germany, Japan remained politically, territorially and symbolically intact. While attacking under the pretense of liberating Asia from Western colonialism and actually violently expanding Japanese rule, it's main goal had been, as Skya summarizes "...to destroy the liberal international world order created by the Anglo-Saxon people. This was a gigantic task: trying to destroy ideas in the minds of people throughout the world is not an easy thing to do. Nevertheless, it had to be

attempted if world harmony was to be achieved.”¹⁹ This strategy, however, was not only anti-Western: “State Shinto and Shinto ultranationalism were inherently anti-Asian. They were also anti-Buddhist and anti-Confucian, the two leading systems of continental Asian thought derived from India and China.”²⁰ Skya hopes that the silence about Japanese imperial behavior in the 20th century will end. He writes: “It is now more than sixty years since German and Japanese ultranationalism were defeated. Is it not time for the taboo on the discussion of radical Shinto ultranationalism to be lifted so scholars can scrutinize the ideology with the same objectivity and intensity and with the same critical perspective and passion that Western scholars have applied to the cases of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism?”²¹

In light of the recent tensions between Japan and the PRC concerning the status of the small islands in the China Sea, called Senkaku by the Japanese and Diaoyu by the Chinese, that were claimed by both countries it would be appropriate to point out that the controversy was started by the Japanese government when officially ending a tentative consensual agreement about the unsettled sovereignty status of the islands and taking possession of them. This Japanese behavior was not criticized but tolerated by the US government and seen as a sign of Chinese expansionism, though the US was partly responsible for the unsettled status since WWII. Coming immediately to the defense of Japan, reinforced the Chinese impression that the US has never completely understood how its lenient treatment of imperial Japan after the war created lingering anti-American feelings in China. After all, the Japanese ultranationalists considered that China was not really a nation. It was, as Skya, comments “... common among nearly all Japanese

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 278.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 306.

²¹ Ibid., p. 296.

radical Shinto ultranationalist thinkers and was one argument they used to justify taking over territory in China.”²² The island incident was a reminder of Japanese colonial attitudes since the Meiji restoration, but for reasons of Western historical ignorance not reported as such in the Western media.

That brings me back to the unwillingness of General MacArthur to prosecute Emperor Hirohito in 1945 and the consequences of this American refusal for Chinese and Asian politics in general. The trial of the emperor would have been in line with English and American history. After all, the first European monarch who was put on trial, found guilty, sentenced to death and finally beheaded was King Charles I of England. The whole process took no longer than ten days in January of 1649. Though the republic that was proclaimed lasted not longer than a decade, it was followed, after a period of monarchical restoration under Charles II, by the *Glorious Revolution* and the constitutional containment of monarchy. In a way, this English process was also an anticipation of the events that followed in the American colonies a few decades later and led to the founding of the American Republic in 1789. The Anglo-American de-mythologization of monarchy found its equivalent in the early 20th century first in China with the liberal revolution of Sun Yat-sen in December of 1911 and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in Nanjing on January 1 1912. It was followed in Russia by the two revolutions in February and October of 1917 and the execution of the Czar and his entire family. And finally there were the abdications of the German Emperor and all other German monarchs after WWI. It is amazing that General MacArthur did not look at these historical precedents in order to come up with a far reaching solution for post-war Japan. The fear of chaos after the trial and possible execution of the emperor and the overthrow

²² Ibid., p. 305.

of the emperor system in its entirety blinded him against the positive evolution that politics could have taken in Japan.

Yet was it only the fear of chaos that made him avoid initiating a process of radical transformation that had taken place in many Western and Eastern societies before? After President Truman had relieved him of his duties in 1951, MacArthur went before a senate committee and was asked about the different treatment the American occupiers had used to pacify the Japanese and the Germans after the war. His answer sounds today bizarre but was in the early 1950s quite acceptable and supported by some popular anthropologists. It smacks of the anti-Asian racism that was rampant during the war and continued to influence American attitudes for many years to come. He said on May 3, 1951: “If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in development in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standard of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of 12 as compared to our own development.”²³ This paternalistic attitude saved Japan from being treated like Germany.

²³ Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally. Reimagining the Japanese Enemy*. Cambridge/Mass./London: Harvard University Press 2006, p. 55.